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THE SUPREME COURT IN REAL TIME: HASTE,
WASTE, AND BUSH V. GORE
Michael Herz*

I
The legal proceedings following the 2000 election had their
moments of humor. The oral argument in Bush v. Gore 1 may have
produced the most guffaws, as Joseph Klock struggled to name the
Justices of the Supreme Court, or even to limit himself to those currently
living. But if one finds humor in the absurd, the comic highpoint came
34 hours later (34 hours!) when the Court released its decision. Network
"runners"-presumably the employees who had distinguished
themselves at company picnics, the network softball league, or summer
corporate challenge races-"-grabbed copies, dashed outside, and handed
them to on-air reporters who were waiting in the darkness on the
Supreme Court plaza, breathless with anxiety and anticipation. The
reporters then ludicrously attempted to understand, synthesize, and
explain 65 pages of judicial exposition instantaneously. The reporters
stumbled badly, and everyone remained in the dark, in every sense.
The televised farce received some slightly smug attention in the
next morning's New York Times. One article observed that the coverage
was "almost at the level of comedy,"2 and another, entitled "Once Again,
the TV Mystery Prevails as Late-Night Fare,"3 included this blow-byblow:

Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. For helpful conversations
and comments on an earlier draft, my thanks to Rebecca Brown, Neal Devins, Dan Farber, Martin
Flaherty, Myriam Gilles, David Golove, and David Strauss.
1. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. William Glaberson, Contesting the Vote: The Legal Analysis - With Critical Decision
Comes Tide a/Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at A24.
3. Peter Marks, Contesting the Vote: The Media - Once Again, the TV Mystery Prevails as
Late-Night Fare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
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"Tell me if you see any movement yet," Brian Williams, the MSNBC
anchor, said to Mr. Kur on the air, as the correspondent peered right
and left for the first sighting of the network employee who was to
deliver the opinion to him.
"Here comes our runner!" Mr. Kur announced, and as Mr. Williams
offered bits of encouragement, the reporter began flipping anxiously
through the document. "Hang on, Brian!" Mr. Kur said, struggling to
find a page that offered some encapsulation of the decision, "Looking
for the summary."
When at last he found something, Mr. Kur began reading aloud, but the
legalese was almost impossible to make sense of. The mandate placed
on television for instant clarity and coherence proved elusive. 4

Although the television reporters' struggles in some ways amused
the newspaper reporters, there seems at least as much sympathy as
smugness in the newspaper accounts-recognition that "there but for the
grace of God." For the print journalists knew they enjoy one enormous
advantage over their television colleagues. That is the luxury of
time-time to read, to discuss, to think. Television gave us something
instant but incoherent. Not laboring under the instantaneousness
mandate, the newspaper reporters were able to provide greater clarity
and coherence. By the next morning, with a little time between the
event and the coverage, the newspapers (and, by then, TV and radio)
could tell us with reasonable clarity what the Court had actually held and
its stated rationales for doing so.
Exactly that sort of advantage is usually enjoyed by the Supreme
Court. In Bush v. Gore, unfortunately, the Court put itself in the role of
the television reporters who were fumbling in the dark rather than those
who could read first and report later, in the clear light of day. The Court
attempted the judicial equivalent of instantaneousness, operating in real
time. The fiasco that resulted will not cause the Court irreparable harm
(to use language with which the nation became familiar over that
weekend), but it is a reminder of the importance of the Court keeping
some distance from the disputes it decides. In particular, the episode
. highlights the increased risks of both actual and perceived politicization
when the Court is in the middle of the fray, participating in an event in
the present rather than evaluating it after the fact.

4. Id. at A25.
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II
The co:r:i.ventional wisdom is that distance enhances the Court's
decisionmaking. Many factors ensure a separation between a particular
controversy and its participants, on the one hand, and the Court, on the
other. The Justices' political insulation (life tenure, salary protections,
no need to please a boss or an electorate), their lack of a personal stake
in the controversy, and training and .a turn of mind that, generally and
relatively speaking, incline toward considerations of law and principle
rather than politics and expediency are all part of the picture. No less
important, however, is the time lag between a particular event or
legislative or judicial decision and the Court's subsequent review of it. 5
Normally, a Supreme Court case involves events that occurred
years ago, and legal issues that have percolated through the lower courts.
Bush v. Gore was just the. opposite-a mad dash. Although preceded
and surrounded by other lawsuits, 6 the specific case that became Bush v.
Gore began on November 27, WOO, after the Florida Secretary of State
certified George Bush as the winner of that state's electoral votes. This
was an election contest action brought by Vice President Gore against
Governor Bush and others under Florida Statutes' § 102.168 seeking the
inclusion of certain Gore votes and a recount in specified counties.
Following a two-day trial, on December 4, 2000, the trial court entered
judgment for the defendants. 7 The next day, the Florida Supreme Court
5. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 834 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that
one advantage to rejecting an expedited appeal by Members of Congress challenging the Line Item
Veto Act was that "the presence of a party beyond the Government places the Judiciary at some
remove from the political forces, [and] the need to await injury to such a plaintiff allows the courts
some greater separation in the time between the political resolution and the judicial review").
6. Previously, the Supreme Court had heard the similar, though technically separate, case of
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). In that case, which also
proceeded with extraordinary speed, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the Secretary of State had
to accept the results of certain manual recounts that she had deemed impermissible. The petition for
certiorari raised essentially the same issues that were ultimately argued in Bush v. Gore. However,
the Supreme Court denied certiorari with regard to the equal protection and due process issues
raised by "standardless" recounts, limiting the grant to the federal statutory questions and the
question whether the Florida Supreme Court had so misapplied Florida law as to take from the state
legislature authority to determine how Florida would pick its electors. There the Florida Supreme
Court decision came down November 21, 2000; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on
November 24; opening briefs were submitted November 28 and reply briefs November 30; oral
argument took place on Friday, December 1; and the decision came down Monday, December 4. In
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, a unanimous Supreme Court failed to reach any
conclusive result, vacating and remanding for a more complete explanation of the grounds for the
state supreme court decision.
7. Gore v. Harris, No. CV 00-2808 (2d Jud. Cir. Dec. 4, 2000) (Sauls, J.), available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/e1ection/00-2431_transcript.pdf, rev'd in part and ajf'd in part, 772 So.2d
1243 (Fla. S. Ct. 2000) (per curium).
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agreed to hear a direct appeal; briefs were due by noon December 6; oral
argument was set for the morning of December 7. The court decided the
case the next day, December 8, reversing iO: part and affirming in part. 8
Critically, it ordered a statewide manual recount, under the supervision
of a state circuit court judge, pursuant to which observers would seek to
dete:i;mine the "intent of the voter" in all cases where machine-counting
had not indicated any vote for President.
That day, President Bush sought a stay of the state Supreme Court's
ruling from the United States Supreme Court. The lawyers argued that
the recounts mandated by the state supreme court would run past the
December 12 "deadline," were inconsistent with the state election
statutes, and were arbitrary and standardless. Accordingly, they violated
(1) the federal statutory provision governing congressional counting of
electoral votes,9 (2) the constitutional allocation of authority to the state
legislature to determine the manner in which the state selects its
electors, 10 and (3) the equal protection and due process clauses. 11 The
Court granted the stay the next day, Saturday, December 9, and, treating
the petition for a stay as a petition for certiorari, granted certiorari as
well. 12 Briefs were due by 4:00 p.m. on December 10, and oral
argument set for 10:00 a.m. Monday, December 11. 13 The Court handed
down its decision at a little before 10:00 p.m. the following evening. 14
Only four similar instances come to mind in which the modem
Court considered cases involving matters of great national importance
on a highly expedited schedule. The steel seizure case, 15 the Nixon tapes
case, 16 the Iranian assets case, 17 and the Pentagon Papers case 18 were all

8. Gore v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1243 (Fla. S. Ct. 2000) (per curiam).
9. 3 u.s.c. § 5 (2000).
10. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (per curiam) (on application for stay).
13. Id.
14. It is unlikely that the opinions were in fact written entirely in the day and a half after the
oral argument. Under the circumstances-the Court's sense that it should get an opinion out on the
12'\ the fact that the Justices had had to think about the merits in considering the motion for a
stay-it is impossible to believe that work had not begun on the opinions before oral argument
began Monday morning. Cf DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF
THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 307 (1996) (reporting that Justice Brennan had a law clerk begin
researching legal issues in the Pentagon Papers case, and had already decided how he would vote,
before the petitions for certiorari had been filed); infra note 24 and accompanying text (concerning
speculation as to whether Chief Justice Marshall prepared his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland in
advance).
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
16. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
17. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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litigated in a matter of weeks or months and produced almost instant
opinions from the Supreme Court (19, 16, 8, and 4 days after oral
argument, respectively). But these are rarities. And even by these
standards Bush v. Gore set new records for speed-for the overall
litigation, for the briefing schedule, and for the period within which the
Court reached its decision.
The speed of Bush v. Gore is less striking when compared to the
standards of an earlier time. The Supreme Court once decided cases
much more quickly than is the current norm. During the period from
1815 to 1835, for example, the Court decided 66 constitutional cases
with full opinion; 17 of those opinions were handed down within five
days of the argument, including several of the Court's most significant
rulings. 19 "By contemporary standards, the Marshall Court was
breathtakingly swift to render decisions."20 By the following century,
the pace had slowed. Robert Post has calculated that during the 19121920 Terms the Court averaged 63.7 days from the argument of a case to
the announcement of a full opinion. 21 In contrast, during the 1993-1998
Terms the Court took an average of 91.1 days after argument to hand
down its decision. 22
Even by Marshall Court standards, however, Bush v. Gore was
something astonishing.
Compare, for example, McCulloch v.
23
Maryland.
Oral argument in McCulloch ended on March 3, 1819;
Marshall handed down his opinion for the Court a mere three days later,
on March 6. The turnaround time was so quick, and the opinion so
lengthy and complex, that some have speculated that Marshall had
written it before the argument. Such was the supposition of Albert
Beveridge, who deemed it "not unlikely" and "reasonably probable" that
Marshall worked out the framework, if not the actual text, well in
advance. 24 Speedy though this is, the scenario is still quite different
18. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
19. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 181
(1988).
20. Id.
21. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1282-83 & n.53 (2001)
(Figure 4).
22. Id.
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24. 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 290 (1919). McCulloch
provoked a never-to-be-repeated exchange in the public press between the Chief Justice and the
decision's critics. Marshall's lengthy· pseudonymous defenses were published in the Philadelphia
Union and the Alexandria Gazette in late March and early April. Gerald Gunther argues that the
scope and speed of these impressive efforts suggest that Marshall's opinion in McCulloch was not
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from Bush v. Gore. The fact that Marshall took three days rather than a
day and a half is the least of it. More important, McCulloch was decided
after nine days of oral argument,25 it concerned a completely familiar
26
legal issue that had been argued by leading figures for decades and
27
whose resolution was not seriously in doubt, and the decision was
unanimous. 28 Most important, the only rush in McCulloch was between
argument and opinion; the overall litigation had proceeded at a quick but
not at all extraordinary pace. 29
The risks of the mad dash are several, and all were painfully on
display in Bush v. Gore. First, rather than giving their considered
judgment, the Justices were shooting from the hip on extremely difficult
legal issues. They were completely without time for reflection, study, or
debate, all the things one wants when faced with a difficult problem. In
addition, the Court was without the usual assistance from the parties or
written in advance. Gerald Gunther, Introduction to JOHN MARsHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCUUOCH
V. MARYLAND 18 (1969) [hereinafter MARSHALL'S DEFENSE].
25. BEVERIDGE, supra note 24, at 288 & n. 5. The case was argued from February 22-27 and
March 1-3, 1819. Id.
26. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 7-17 (4 th ed. 2000) (describing background of and constitutional debate concerning the
first and second national banks). Beveridge points out that in preparing his biography of George
Washington Marshall had read Hamilton's and Jefferson's Cabinet opinions on the constitutionality
of a national bank. BEVERIDGE, supra note 24, at 290 n.1. Many have noted the overlap of the
McCulloch opinion and Hamilton's arguments for the constitutionality of the bank. See, e.g., id.;
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 66 (4th ed. 2001) ("Hamilton ... offered a
defense of the constitutionality of the bank that was quite close to Chief Justice Marshall's.").
27. BREST, supra note 26, at 30 ("When McCulloch was decided in 1819, few persons of
stature in the national political community genuinely disputed the . . . constitutionality of the
national bank."); WHITE, supra note 19, at 544; David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 887, 930 (1982) (deeming
it "surprising that Marshall treated all this as an open question").
28. G. Edward White has pointed out that the apparent unanimity of the Marshall court in so
many cases actually masked more significant divisions among the Justices. "An opinion of the
Court merely reflected one Justice's effort to advance a formal justification for a majority decision
made orally and informally." WHITE, supra note 19, at 189. An opinion did not necessarily reflect
either agreement or the reasoning of any other Justice who joined in the result. The Court's "internal
practices ... fostered an appearance of harmony on substantive issues/' but not the consensus that a
similar lack of separate opinions indicates today. Id. at 194. Regardless of whether the silence
reflects submission or enthusiastic agreement, it remains the case that less time is necessary to
produce a single opinion for the Court, about which other Justices are not too picky, than it does to
produce an opinion that really pleases the other Justices or that responds to points made in separate
opinions.
29. The Maryland tax statute was passed in February 1818 and the case proceeded quickly in
the state County Court and the state's court oflast resort, the Court of Appeals. McCulloch, 17 U.S.
(4 Wpeat) at 316. The latter rendered its decision in June 1818; the Supreme Court docketed the
case in September of that year; the oral argument began on February 22, 1819. WHITE, supra note
19, at 543; BEVERIDGE, supra note 24, at 288 n. 5. Compare the course of the litigations described
at supra notes 15-18 and infra note 56.
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other judges. The parties themselves had had very little time to develop,
refine, and brief the issues. The equal protection issue, on which the
case turned, had received no consideration from any other court or
individual judge before it was laid before the Supreme Court. 30 As the
Court in other circumstances has emphasized, it benefits from the
"percolation" of legal issues in the lower courts before it decides them. 31
Thus, many basic structures designed to give the Court the best chance
of getting it right were absent.
The point is not just that slow work is sure work, though that is part
of it. 32 The point is also that when the Court's consideration is so rapid
the chances increase that the decision will rest on purely political
considerations. Deciding a case based on one's initial, impressionistic
reaction; being all too aware of how different outcomes will affect a
current emergency; not having the chance to let the problem sit and then
come back to it-all these make it more likely that one's decision will
reflect intuition, prejudice, and preference.
Now, judicial
decisionmaking always reflects intuition, prejudice, and preference;
30. The Florida trial and Supreme Court decisions turned solely on statutory issues under state
law. Neither court addressed the issue of whether the interpretation sought by the Vice President,
and adopted by the Supreme Court, was unconstitutional. It is true that Chief Justice Wells, in
dissent, stated (correctly, as it turned out) that "this system of county-by-county decisions regarding
how a dimpled chad is counted is fraught with equal protection concerns which will eventually
cause the election results in Florida to be stricken by the federal courts or Congress." Gore v.
Harris, 772 So.2d 1243, 1267 (2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting). However, the Chief Justice did
nothing more than state this unsupported conclusion.
31. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (rejecting a rule ofnonmutual
collateral estoppel in cases to which the United States is a party in part because such a rule would
"deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a
difficult question before this Court grants certiorari"). Indeed, the Court's general practice of
waiting for a circuit conflict to develop before granting certiorari, see SUP. CT. R. l0(a), is justified
in part because the conflicting lower court opinions will best inform the Court's own
decisionmaking. See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160; see also United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464
U.S. 165, 173 & n.6 (1984); id. at 177 (White, J., concurring) ("Conflicts in the circuits are
generally accepted and in some ways even welcomed.").
32. One arguable example of rushed consideration affecting the quality of the Court's final
product is the seminal administrative law case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971). On December 7, 1970, a motion for stay was treated as a petition for certiorari and
granted (as in Bush v. Gore). The petitioner's brief was due two weeks later, on December 21; the
response was due on January 4, 1971; oral argument took place on January 11; the opinion came
down March 2. Though Overton Park is an extraordinarily important decision, the opinion contains
several universally acknowledged blunders. For the suggestion that the speed with which the parties
had to prepare their briefs, and with which the Court decided the case, contributed to the errors, see
Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls Over Administrative
Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. R.Ev.1251, 1265-66 & n.45 (1992) (noting that the
timetable "would permit neither the attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor General responsible for
briefing the government's case nor the writers of Supreme Court opinions time to get far beyond the
surface of things").
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nonetheless, it can do so in varying degrees, and those tendencies are
often mitigated simply by giving a problem some time.
This risk is particularly acute when ·the case involves unfamiliar
legal issues. Bush v. Gore was not one more search and seizure case, or
one more free speech case, arising in an area with which the Justices are
familiar and already have a doctrinal framework and a jurisprudential
worldview within which to fit the specific dispute. Compare, for
example, McCulloch, which involved an utterly familiar and
longstanding constitutional question. 33 A more contemporary example is
United States v. Eichman, 34 in which the Court struck down the federal
Flag Protection Act of 1989,35 handing down its decision a mere 27 days
after argument, on direct appeal from the District Court, after expedited
briefing and a special late-Term oral argument, all under pressure of a
statute requiring expedited review. 36 From the date the Court took the
case to the date it decided it was only 73 days. 37 While still a far cry
from Bush v. Gore, that was pretty fast. But the case itself was largely a
33. See supra notes 26-27. The pseudonymous Amphictyon essays attacking McCulloch,
which ran in the Richmond Enquirer from March 30 to April 2, 1819, noted:
That this opinion is very able, every one must admit. This was to have been expected, proceeding
as it does from a man of the most profound legal attainments, and upon a subject which has
employed his thoughts, his tongue, and his pen, as a politician, and an historian, for more than thirty
years. The subject too, is one which has, perhaps more than any other, heretofore drawn a broad
line of distinction between the two great parties in this country, in which line no one has taken a
more distinguished and decided rank than the judge who has thus expounded the supreme law of the
land.
MARSHALL'S DEFENSE, supra note 24, at 54. From a distance, it is hard to know how much Marc
Antony there is in these words; certainly one reading is that the author is painting Marshall as
biased, politicized, and close-minded. Whatever Amphictyon's point may have been, mine is only
that the subject was utterly familiar, to Marshall and others, by the time McCulloch was decided.
34. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
35. Pub. L. No. 101- 131, 103 Stat. 777 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1989)).
36. See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312-13. The Flag Protection Act was one of several recent
instances in which Congress has required expedited judicial review, including consideration by a
three-judge district court and direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Other examples include the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (struck down on expedited review in Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986)); the Line-Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 691(Supp. III 1997)) (set aside, on expedited review, in Byrd v. Raines, 956
F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997), vacated, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (lack of standing), and in Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998)); and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43 (1996) (struck down on expedited review in Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
37. The District Court's decision was released on March 5, United States v. Eichman, 731 F.
Supp. 1123 (D.D.C. 1990); that in a companion case was released on February 21, United States v.
Haggerty, 731 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Wash. 1990). The Court noted probable jurisdiction on March
30, 494 U.S. 1063 (1990), heard oral argument on May 14, and released its decision on June 11, 496
U.S. 310 (1990).
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reprise of the previous Term's decision in Texas v. Johnson, 38 to which
the Flag Protection Act was a response. The Justices were on well-trod
turf, having only to consider whether the slight differences between the
federal law and the state law they had just struck down in Johnson
justified a different result. The specific problem and the overall setting
were familiar. In utter contrast, Bush v. Gore presented novel issues. It
is no slight to the Justices' erudition to suggest that none was familiar
with the intricacies of the Electoral College provisions in Title 3 of the
U.S. Code or with the Florida contest and protest statutes.
Finally, by rushing into the maelstrom rather than reviewing it in
the calm light of day, the Court did much to further the perception that it
had become a purely political actor.
The decision has been
overwhelmingly attacked as partisan. 39 This reaction stems primarily
from the 5-4 conservative/liberal split, combined with an apparent
abandonment by all nine Justices of their usual positions on "neutral
principles" such as federalism, respect for state courts, and narrow or
broad readings of constitutional rights. The validity of the ubiquitous
political-operatives-in-robes attack is beyond the scope of this essay.
My narrower point is that the extraordinary speed with which the Court
acted significantly added to the overwhelming impression of the Court
as a partisan institution. At a minimum, it eliminated an important
barrier to hyper-legal-realist cynicism; it may have contributed to that
38. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
39. The examples are legion. Here is Anthony Amsterdam:
The important point to notice in the presidential election case is not simply the Supreme Court's
abandonment of any pretense at behaving like a court of law. It is not even the sickening hypocrisy
and insincere constitutional posturing with which the court's foray into president-making is dressed
up. It is that the court finally has revealed unmistakably what it does all the time and usually gets
away with: masking result-driven, political, unprincipled decisions in the guise of obedience to rules
oflaw which the justices feel completely free to twist and retwist to suit their purposes.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Law is Left Twisting Slowly in the Wind, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000,
at M5. See also Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48
(describing decision as an act of raw partisanship that may, unfortunately, "provoke another great
renaissance of legal nihilism in our nation's law schools, a cynicism that will slowly erode general
confidence in the system"); 637 Law Professors Say By Stopping the Vote Count in Florida, The
U.S. Supreme Court Used Its Power To Act as Political Partisans, Not Judges of a Court of Law,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2000, at A7 (advertisement) (also at http://www.the-rule-of-law.com) ("The
five justices were acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges."); Ronald
Dworkin, A Badly Flawed Election, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53, 54 ("[T]hose ofus who
have been arguing for many years that the Supreme Court makes America a nation of principle have
a special reason for sorrow."). But see Charles Fried, Letter to the Editors, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb.
22, 2001, at 8 (taking issue with Dwo.rkin's attack on the Court and suggesting, among other things,
that the equal protection ruling was "hardly a cause for fulmination, dire warnings of the sort issued
by Justice Stevens, or imputation of dishonestly partisan motives"); John 0. McGinnis, A Just and
Wise Action, N.Y. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at 41.
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cynicism. If the Court accelerates its ordinary processes in order to
solve a political crisis, it will inescapably be perceived as deciding on
political grounds, for that is how political problems are decided. Not
only was the Court in Bush v. Gore ruling on a political battle, it had
become a participant in that battle. The usual insulation and distance
had evaporated.
The per curiam opinion tried hard to limit the decision to its facts. 40
Many have observed that the opinion seems a prime example of just the
sort of decisionmaking to which Justice Roberts was objecting when he
complained that the Court's overruling a recent decision "tends to bring
adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad
ticket, good for this day and train only."41 This effort surely reflects the
Court's own lack of confidence as to whether it was getting it right.
Such lack of confidence is hardly a surprise given the circumstances of
the decision. If not an outright admission that they were going too fast,
this statement is close to it. 42 The per curiam seems essentially to say:
"here's our gut reaction, but don't hold us to it." Yet it is a fundamental
characteristic of judicial decisionmaking that judges, unlike other
governmental officials, are h~ld to it. That is the rule oflaw. For that to
happen, the court must take the time to decide the case properly, to give
more than a gut reaction, and to be perceived as doing so.
It may not be necessary to point to counterexamples to this frantic
rush. One famous equal protection decision that comes to mind,
however, is Brown v. Board of Education. 43 In Brown, the Court's own
decisionmaking, as well as the public acceptance of the result (such as it
was), surely benefited from the "deliberate speed" with which the Court
itself proceeded. After lengthy lower court litigation,44 the cases were
40. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents
many complexities.").
41. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Samuel
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 70 (Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE VOTE].
42. David Strauss states that "the majority opinion insisted that its rationale was to be applied,
essentially only in this case-basically conceding-that the result, not the legal principle, dictated the
outcome." David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore, What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE, supra note
41, at 184, 185. Issacharoff similarly complains that "the limiting instruction is either meaningless
or reveals the new equal protection as a cynical vessel used to engage in result-oriented judging by
decree." Issacharoff, supra note 41, at 70. I am suggesting a third possibility: the limiting
instruction is an acknowledgment that under the circumstances the judges in the majority were just
very unsure as to whether they had it right.
43. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. The lower court proceedings are described by the Court in its opening footnote. See id. at
487 n.l.
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argued to the Supreme Court in December 1952. Badly divided accounts vary as to the exact split45 -the Court ordered reargument,
which occurred in December 1953. The unanimous decision came down
on May 17, 1954. Even then, the Court deferred any decision on the
appropriate relief, setting the question for reargument and issuing an
opinion a year later. 46 It is generally agreed that (1) the case was
correctly decided, (2) it might not have come out the same way, and
would certainly not have been unanimous, had it been decided during the
1952-53 Term, and (3) both the correctness and unanimity were critical
to popular acceptance and to counterbalance the strong feeling in many
quarters that the Court had acted lawlessly. The slow pace of the
decision was not the be all and end all, but it was an essential element of
the real and perceived correctness and legitimacy of the decision.
III
The strongest attack on the Court's proceeding at a breakneck pace
came from the dissenting Justice who objected that the Court was
"almost irresponsibly feverish," pursuing a "precipitate timetable" after
a "frenzied train of events," with the result that "the extraordinarily
important and difficult questions" were never fully developed or
examined:
These are difficult questions of fact, of law, and of judgment; the
potential consequences of erroneous decision are enormous. The time
which has been available to us, to the lower courts, and to the parties
has been wholly inadequate for giving these cases the kind of
consideration they deserve. It is a reflection on the stability of the
judicial process that these great issues-as important as any that have
arisen during my time on this Court-should have been decided under
the pressures engendered by the torrent of publicity that has attended

45. The traditional understanding is that the Justices were very badly divided indeed, and the
outcome in doubt. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN VERSUS
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK .AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 613-14 (1976). Michael
Klarman emerged from careful examination of the available judicial papers with the conclusion that
the Justices' "own subsequent tabulations indicated a vote somewhere between five to four for
sustaining school segregation and six to three for striking it down." Michael J. Klarman, An
Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 242 & n.130 (1991).
Mark Tushnet has argued that in fact the Justices were not especially divided but were only "talking
through their concerns about what they knew they were going to do." MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING
CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 194 (1994).
Tushnet's revisionist account is contested in Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It
and How Much Does It Matter?, 83 GEO. L.J. 433, 436-46 (1994).
46. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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these litigations from their inception.

The dissenting Justice in question was not one of the participants in
Bush v. Gore; the excerpts are from Justice Harlan's dissent in New York
Times v. United States. 47 Justice Harlan's opinion remains the strongest
judicial admonition that haste makes waste. 48 And much of what he said
seems directly applicable to Bush v. Gore.
Tempting though it is to invoke Justice Harlan and leave it at that, it
must be conceded that in retrospect his bitterness and dismay seem
misplaced. Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's doubts, the Pentagon
Papers Case is not a cautionary tale about the perils of judicial speed:
Indeed, none of the four modem cases in which the Court has previously
rushed to resolve a pressing dispute of national moment significantly
harmed the Court's reputation, made what is generally seen as bad law,
or required later apologies and backtracking.
To be sure, none of the actual opinions are paradigms of the judicial
craft. 49 With more time, it would have been possible to have fewer than

47. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 753-55 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). See also id. at 748-49 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's "unseemly,"
''unjudicial," and "frenetic haste" and the unwarranted precipitate action rather than "reasonable and
deliberate judicial treatment"). Justice Harlan and Justice Blackmun each also invoked Justice
Holmes's famous and still relevant observation that:
Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their
real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate
overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate
interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem
doubtful, and before which even well settled principles oflaw will bend.
Id. at 752-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (both quoting Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
48. A less ferocious, and less well-known, expression of similar concerns occurred when the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the steel seizure case, bypassing the Court of Appeals to review
the District Court decision directly. Justices Burton and Frankfurter objected to the grant:
The constitutional issue which is the subject of the appeal deserves for its solution all of the
wisdom that our judicial process makes available. The need for soundness in the result outweighs
the need for speed in reaching it. The Nation is entitled to the substantial value inherent in an
intermediate consideration of the issue by the Court of Appeals. Little time will be lost and none
will be wasted in seeking it. The time taken will be available also for constructive consideration by
the parties of their own positions and responsibilities.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937,938 (1952) (memorandum of Burton, J.).
49. The same can be said of the opinions in Bush v. Gore. For example, it is quite striking to
have an equal protection opinion that does not even nod to such basics of equal protection analysis
as the level of scrutiny, the fit between means and ends, or the nature of the governmental interest.
The Justices ignore basic equal protection doctrine about the intent requirement in disparate impact
cases. Several of the opinions purport to be talking about equal protection but slip into due process
here and there. No Justice considered the very real question as to whether the petitioners had
standing; only Justice Breyer seemed vaguely aware of the powerful argument that the case raised a
political question.
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nine separate opinions in New York Times. 50 With more time, Justice
Black might have produced a less wooden and more nuanced opinion for
the Court in the steel seizure case; 51 there, too, the multiplicity of
opinions (there were seven52) might have been avoided, and it might
have been easier to tell who actually joined what (i.e., what the holding
was). 53 Indeed, the problems in these opinions may run deeper than
simply a lack of polish. Peter Strauss, for one, has suggested that the
quality of the Court's reasoning was seriously diminished by the press of
time. Citing Youngstown and United States v. Nixon, Strauss comments
that "the Court's difficulties in deciding separation-of-powers questions
have ... often been compounded by the necessity of reaching a speedy
decision. " 54
50. As Blaise Pascal observed (and as law professors and Law Reviews have perhaps
forgotten), more time should produce shorter rather than longer documents. See BLAISE PASCAL,
LETTRES PROVINClALES (1657), no. 16 ("I have made this [letter] longer than usual, only because I
have not had time to make it shorter.").
51. The point is not simply that Justice Black's opinion is highly formalistic. This
characteristic might be lamented or celebrated, and long and hard consideration can produce
opinions no less so. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Rather, it is that Justice Black combined 'his highly formal approach with a tendency to paint with a
very broad brush. As Paul Gewirtz has written, Black's opinion is a well-known example of the use
of broad language; "[y]et today it is almost universally believed that the more narrowly framed
concurring opinions in that case· capture what it really 'stands for."' Paul Gewirtz, Realism in
Separation ofPowers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 343,352 (1989).
52. Each of the six Justices in the majority wrote separately; there was a single dissent,
authored by Chief Justice Vinson.
53. On the difficulty of figuring out whether a majority of Justices actually endorsed Justice
Black's reasoning in Youngstown, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L.
REV. 327, 327 n.4 (1992) (noting that support for Black's opinion is debatable and, after reviewing
the concurring opinions, concluding that "the actual lineup on whether the President has a
prerogative may have been: no-three votes; not here, elsewhere maybe-two votes; yes-four
votes").
The multiple opinions in steel seizure and Pentagon Papers-and, for that matter, in Bush
v. Gore-make the single, unanimous opinion in the Nixon tapes case all the more striking. One
would expect that consensus on the particulars of the opinion, as opposed to the overall result,
would be the first thing to go when the Court is in a rush.
54. Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Consistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 497 n.30 (1987). Strauss includes
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction
legislation), among the poorly reasoned decisions whose flaws are attributable in part to the press of
time.
Indeed, the very importance of getting this case [i.e., Bowsher] decided during 1986 may
have contributed to the Court's difficulties. The case came to the Court late in the Term,
virtually undeveloped by lower court proceedings, and required an accelerated briefing
schedule. In ordinary course it might have been a strong candidate for an order for
reargument. Certainly, in the past, the Court has used this method to buy time for
thoughtful decision. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Id In Bowsher, the CQurt was following Congress's directions. The Act provided that challenges
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Yet none of these cases is on anybody's list of the Court's major
missteps. None has since been overruled, or limited to its facts. Each
gets prominent and unapologetic treatment in casebooks on
Constitutional Law, without a Marisian asterisk. Courts and lawyers cite
and rely on them without any special explanation or a reminder that one
must bear in mind the circumstances under which the opinions were
produced. Each retains significant, and in some instances fundamental,
doctrinal importance. 55
Thus, history suggests that proceeding at warp speed is not
hopelessly risky for the Court. And if there is one such case every ten or
twenty years, perhaps not that much harm can really be done. Great
cases, hard cases, and rushed cases may not always make bad law after
all.
IV

All of which is not to say that we should be wholly sanguine about
Bush v. Gore. For one thing, to say these four cases were not
embarrassments is a pretty low standard. And dodging bullets does not
mean that the bullets are not dangerous. More important, there are real
differences between these prior cases and Bush v. Gore. Bush v. Gore
was the fastest of all; to release full opinions a day-and-a-half after
argument and a week after the lower court decision beats all records.
Moreover, the lower court litigation had been significantly more
extensive in each of the earlier cases. 56 As a result, there was a more
to its constitutionality would be heard first by a three-Judge District Court, then by the Supreme
Court on an expedited schedule. The Act was signed into law on December 12, 1995; the District
Court released its decision on February 7, 1986. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.
1986). The Supreme Court heard argument on April 23, 1986, and released its decision on July 7,
1986, the last day of the Term.
55. See, e.g., RUDENSTINE, supra note 14, at 355 ("The legal significance of the Court's
decision in the Pentagon Papers case would be difficult to exaggerate .... "); Henry P. Monaghan,
The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1993) ("Steel Seizure represents
the bedrock principle of the constitutional order .... "); Note, The Supreme Court 1996 Term:
Leading Cases, Separation ofPowers - Presidential Immunity, 111 HARV. L. REV. 227, 227 (1997)
(describing United States v. Nixon as a "landmark decision").
56. With regard to the Nixon tapes case: the grand jury's indictment, naming Richard Nixon
as an unindicted coconspirator, was issued on March 1, 1974. On April 18, a subpoena duces tecum
was issued to the President asking for certain tapes and writings. The district court denied a motion
to quash on May 20, rejecting the same arguments considered by the Supreme Court about the scope
of executive privilege and who was its arbiter. On May 24, the Special Prosecutor filed a petition
for a writ of certiorari before judgment. On May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited
briefing schedule. United States v. Nixon, 417 U.S. 960 (1974). Argument was held on July 8,
1974 and the decision handed down on July 24. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 689-91
(1974). Reportedly, Justices White and Blackmun voted against granting certiorari precisely
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developed record, the attorneys had had more time to think through the
issues; the Justices had the benefit of more considered judicial views.
Furthermore, in the earlier cases the Court at least knew what the case
was about when it agreed to hear it. Here, the Court (and the lawyers)
initially thought that Bush v. Gore was, in essence, a statutory case about
the meaning of the Florida election laws and the fairness of the state
Supreme Court's interpretation thereof, and about 3 U.S.C. § 5. Indeed,
the Court denied cert on the equal protection and due process questions
in Bush I. Only at the very last minute did it discover that this was an
equal protection case after all.
These are all differences of degree, and, when compared to the
ordinary run of Supreme Court cases, these four are more like Bush v.
because the case had proceeded too quickly. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 285-93 (1979).
With regard to the Pentagon Papers; the Times began publishing the papers on June 13,
1971. The District Court in New York heard argument on the government's request for an
injunction on June 18; it denied the injunction on June 19. The District Court for the District of
Columbia issued a similar ruling in the case involving the Washington Post on June 21. The Second
Circuit (reversing) and the D.C. Circuit (affirming) handed down decisions on June 23. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 25, 403 U.S. 942 (1971), heard oral argument the next
day, and handed down its decision on June 30, fifteen days after the government had filed its lawsuit
against the Times. RUDENSTINE, supra note 14, at 3-4.
With regard to Dames & Moore: on May 28, 1981, the District Court for the Central
District of California (1) stayed execution of its judgment in the underlying action between Dames
& Moore and the Iranian government, and (2) dismissed Dames & Moore's action against the
United States seeking to invalidate the Executive Orders and regulations that had terminated
pending claims against Iran in the United States and transferred them to the Iranian-American
Claims Tribunal. (The latter action had been filed April 28.) Dames & Moore appealed to the
Ninth Circuit, but also sought a writ of certiorari before judgment from the Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari on June 11. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 452 U.S. 932 (1981) (granting
certiorari). It heard oral argument on June 24 and handed down its decision on July 2. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 666-67 (1981). Although this case went straight from the District
Court to the Supreme Court, two other circuits had ruled on the validity of the challenged
regulations and executive orders. See id. at 667 (citing American Int'! Group, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Chas. T. Main Int'!, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Auth., 651 F.2d 800 (1st Cir. 1981)).
Finally, in the steel seizure case, President Truman issued the Executive Order requiring
Secretary Sawyer to seize the mills on April 8, 1952, prompting an immediate lawsuit and request
for a temporary restraining order. The District Court held a hearing on April 9 and denied a TRO
the same day. After briefing and argument, the District Court enjoined the seizure on April 29. The
D.C. Circuit issued a stay the next day and, after oral argument, issued an opinion on May 2
reaffirming the stay. The petition for certiorari was filed on May 2 and granted on May 3 (bypassing the Court of Appeals). The Supreme Court heard argument May 12 and 13, and handed
down its decision on June 2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583-84
(1952); see generally ALAN F. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1958).
Like White and Blackmun in the Nixon tapes case, Justices Frankfurter and Burton would
have denied certiorari in light of the accelerated pace of the litigation. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 937 (1952) (memorandum of Burton, J.).
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Gore than unlike it. Nonetheless, the pace of Bush v. Gore was uniquely
frantic, the record especially thin, and the level of confusion especially
high.
A more important difference, perhaps, is that in the four earlier
cases, the world waited for the Supreme Court. In Bush v. Gore, the
Court rushed to keep pace with the world. In each of the earlier cases,
the Court sped up its normal processes in order to minimize the
disruption and delay that its consideration caused; however, it did not
operate under an external deadline. In Bush v. Gore, the Court was
determined to release its opinion by the December 12th "deadline." It
did so, technically. But the 10:00 p.m. release only confirmed that the
Court was caught in the maw of events. Indeed, the timing almost
conclusively establishes that the opinions were released before they were
ready. That is the inescapable conclusion from two factors. The first, of
course, is simply the extreme speed with which they appeared. The
second is the fact that they were released two hours before the deadline
expired, at an unheard hour of the night. Had the opinions come down at
noon, one might think that that was when they were done. Appearing
when they did, we must assume that the Court ran out of time.
It is this combination of factors-the extreme speed plus the crunch
of a deadline not of the Court's making-that was, I think, so pernicious.
The raw speed with which the Court acted raised a host of concerns
about its ability to do its job well, but did not render that impossible.
Indeed, it speaks well for the Court that it can, when necessary, rise to
the challenge of a real emergency when, in the words of the Supreme
Court's rules, a "case is of such imperative public importance as to ...
require immediate determination."57 And it speaks well for the Court
that it has rightly perceived such emergencies to be few and far between.
However, in Bush v. Gore the Court not only acted with unprecedented
haste, it did so on a timetable set by external events, which were not
waiting. It thus became a participant in those events.
I will return to that theme in the next section. First, however, one
final possible difference between the four prior rushed decisions and
Bush v. Gore deserves mention. In each of the four, the Court reached a
decisive result-there was a clear winner and a clear loser-but
doctrinally it struck a middle ground. Taking the opinions as a whole,
the doctrinal propositions established in each case are b~tween poles.
The President does enjoy an important privilege, but he is not above the
law and must make a convincing showing of the need for
57. S. CT. R. 11 (regarding writs of certiorari to the courts of appeals before judgment).
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confidentiality; 58 the President is not limited to mere law-execution, but
when venturing into the lawmaking arena· he must have clear statutory
authority to do so; 59 the First Amendment does not bar all prior
restraints, but the government cannot enjoin publication of information
merely because it has labeled that information "classified."60 It is not at
all clear that the Court charted a middle course in Bush v. Gore. The
implications of the decision with regard to voting rights and the
mechanics of voting are extraordinarily far-reaching.
The Court
required a precise equality of treatment that it has rarely if ever required
regarding voting or anything else. 61 While the per curiam opinion was at
pains to caution against too strong a reading; it was the very sweep of
the rationale that made such cautions necessary.
V
With the Court injecting itself into the political fray as it did, it is
hardly a surprise that the hapless reporters treated the release of the
decision like any other political announcement. The reporters saw the
ruling as simply the announcement of an outcome-the result of the
presidential election,-which could be noted and reported like the
outcome of any other election. They struggled because they tried to treat
a Supreme Court opinion like an envelope at an awards ceremony ("And
the Oscar goes to .... "). The assumption was that they could glance at
the opinions and know instantly all there was to know, and that all there
58. On the "middle-groundness" of United States v. Nixon, see JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 384-89 (1994).
59. Monaghan, supra note 55, at 11.
60. RUDENSTINE, supra note 14, at 351-52. This characterization cannot be applied to
McCulloch, where Marshall's opinion came down very much at one pole of a familiar debate.
61. One might analogize the Court's decisions regarding districting and the one-person-onevote principle. Relying on Article I, § 2 of the Constitution, the Court has required that a State's
congressional districts be as identical in size to one another as is humanly possible. See Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969) ("[T]he State is required to 'make a good-faith effort to
achieve precise mathematical equality.... ' [Article I, § 2] permits only the limited population
variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for
which justification is shown."). Thus, in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983), the Court set
aside a redistricting plan in which the largest district had a population of 527,472 and the smallest
523,798. In contrast, applying the equal protection clause to review state legislative districts, the
Court has applied a much more relaxed standard. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320-25
(1973) (acknowledging that the "more stringent standards" applicable to congressional districting
are not applicable to state legislative districting). The Court in Mahan upheld a 16.4% population
deviation, noting, however, that it "may well approach tolerable limits." Id. at 329. See generally
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 145 (1998) (state legislative districts with population deviations "in the vicinity of IO
percent" have been held presumptively valid). That sort of flexibility disappears in Bush v. Gore.
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was to know was who won.
But that is a fundamentally incorrect and destructive understanding
of the Court's opinions. The Oscar, or the presidential election, comes
without an explanation. The outcome is the salient fact, and it is, by
definition, the right outcome. We have no other meaningful way of
assessing the correctness of the outcome than by counting the votes.
The people may be foolish, shortsighted, misled, or plagued by poor
judgment; that does not make their selection incorrect. (In contrast, a
fraudulent election can be said to produce the wrong outcome precisely
because the result does not reflect the popular choice.) The winner of
the election is rightly the President because he won the election; popular
approval is self-legitimating. Put differently, elections provide a form of
"pure procedural justice"-the result is by definition just if it was
achieved by the prescribed procedures. 62
In contrast, the winner of a Supreme Court case is not rightly the
winner because she prevailed; the vote of the Supreme Court is not selflegitimating. (In this sense, Justice Jackson's famous aphorism-"[W]e
are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible only because we
are final" 63 -is a gross overstatement, accurate only as a description of a
practical reality.) If the Court is foolish, shortsighted, misled, or plagued
by poor judgment, its result is wrong. And for these reasons, the Court's
own explanations for its decision must be taken seriously. In Bush v.
Gore, it matters that only three Justices were willing to reject the Florida
Supreme Court's reading of state law; it matters that seven Justices, not
five, agreed there had been an equal protection violation; and if their
explanations for these positions are unconvincing that matters as well.
To say, "Bush won, 5-4," is not just incomplete, it is inherently
misleading.
The point is not that the reporters were foolish. Rather, it is that the
circumstances predictably and perhaps unavoidably channeled them
toward this approach to the Court. And the circumstances importantly
included the furious pace of the Court's consideration and lack of any
temporal distance between the relevant events and the Court's
consideration of them.

62. On procedural justice, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 85~89 (1971). Rawls's
example of pure procedural justice is gambling. The outcome cannot be justified other than by the
fact that it was the result of certain procedures, but that alone makes it just. Id. at 86.
63. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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VI
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel wrote of the
courts' advantage over the political branches in pursuing principle rather
than policy:
[W]hen the pressure for immediate results is strong enough and
emotions ride high enough, [legislators] will ordinarily prefer to act on
expediency rather than take the long view .... [C]ourts have certain
capacities for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and
executives do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure,
the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in
pursuing the ends of government. ...
Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the
capacity to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their
aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment's hue and
cry. This is what Justice Stone called the opportunity for "the sober
second thought. " 64

Bickel's account is easy to mock, and in the best of times it is not
clear that the Justices are pursuing the "ways of the scholar." (For that
matter, it is not always clear that law professors are pursuing the ways of
the scholar either.) Nonetheless, his account is both appealing and valid.
It is also laughably inapplicable to the Court that decided Bush v. Gore,
which was part of the hue and cry. Who knows what the 2000 election
or the decision it produced will look like on sober second thought. It
seems at least safe to say that the Court's conservatives will be fleeing
from and attempting to distinguish the per curiam opinion for years to
come, just as the liberals will be struggling with language from the
dissents (for example, about tolerating some "play in the joints"65 and
recognizing that ''we live in an imperfect world" 66). Beyond that,
however, we just do not know, and that's the point.
Breathing room between event and judicial consideration is not the
only important thing. After all, for all Bickel's emphasis on this passive
virtue, his own first, and perhaps only, foray into the courtroom was, of
64. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 25-26 (1962). See also id. at 116 (noting that the time lag "cushions the clash
between the Court and any given legislative majority and strengthens the Court's hand in gaining
acceptance for its principles").
65. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Baine Peanut Co.
v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499,501 (1931)). ·
66. Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Ideally, perfection would be the appropriate
standard for judging the recount. But we live in an imperfect world .... ").
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all things, as the attorney for the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers
case, pressing forward with "unseemly haste" in the case that held the
previous record for fastest Supreme Court decision. 67 And speed does
not doom the Court. Notably, the four other "great cases" considered
with such rapidity are not generally seen as having made "bad law,"
although neither are they lauded as paradigms of judicial craft.
The per curiam opinion asserted that the Court had no choice but to
proceed as it did; it had been "forced to fulfill" an "unsought
responsibility." 68 This was not technically true; the Court could have
denied certiorari. Perhaps as a practical matter it had no real choice,
though many would dispute that as well. 69 Even accepting the
majority's characterization, however, Bush v. Gore and the outcry thfl,t
surrounds it stand as a reminder that Bickel was right. The Court is well
served by proceeding in judicial rather than real time.

67. RUDENSTINE, supra note 14, at 290 (noting that Bickel had never made a courtroom
argument before appearing in this case, in which he argued in the District Court on June 18, the
Court of Appeals on June 22, and the Supreme Court on June 30).
68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
69. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE, supra note
41, at 38-39 (arguing that the Court should have stayed its hand and allowed Congress to resolve
any dispute as to Florida's electoral votes).

